Introduction

Obtaining security guarantees became one of the most important elements in the integration of the Baltic States into European structures after the collapse of the Soviet Union. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Baltic States, the integration of these states into the West began. Membership of NATO and the EU, as well as relations with the United States, have helped the Baltic States take the path towards Europe. After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Baltic States saw the need to make changes in terms of total defence. Moscow’s military operation in Syria launched in 2015 was also significant in this context. The security of the Baltic States is currently guaranteed, e.g. by the strengthening of the eastern flank through the creation of a rapid response force called a Spearhead, as well as the stationing of NATO combat battalions in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. These troops are also deployed in Poland. Air defence missions, i.e. Baltic Air Policing and the Eagle Guardian defence plan in case of aggression from Russia, have also become significant for the defence of the Baltic States. Russia’s aggressive actions target not only the armed forces, but also the population in the conflict areas. They can be hybrid actions that combine different means of impact. There is a large disparity in military potentials between Russia and the Baltic States. Therefore, the concept of total defence, in addition to the conventional strengthening of defence capabilities, implies the involvement of the whole society in defence activities.

The issues addressed in the article are directly related to the research interests of the security sciences. Many publications on defence can be found in the Polish scientific literature, but they usually discuss the conventional model of defence with the dominant role of the armed forces. The implementation of total defence in the Baltic States is much less frequently addressed. This concept has long been implemented in Scandinavian countries, as well as in Singapore, Israel and the Swiss Confederation. For the Baltic States, it is relatively new. Progress in the implementation of assumptions of the total defence concept in the Baltic States may have seemed something unattractive in the eyes of researchers, which is why they did not focus on it too often in the Polish literature. It is also noteworthy that issues strictly related to the defence of Ukraine in connection with the ongoing conflict have received more attention in the academic literature. This article aims to assess the progress of the implementation of the total defence concept in the Baltic States. The author focused on the individual actions taken in the implementation of the total defence concept in the Baltic States, comparing the strategic assumptions adopted with the solutions actually implemented.

The article uses publicly available data available on government websites on topics related to the security and defence of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The research on the progress of the implementation of the total defence concept in the Baltic States used the method of analysing the literature related to the security and defence issues of the Baltic States.

Information on the essence of the concept of total defence and the ways in which it has been interpreted in the various Baltic States provides a starting point for further reflections. The following section discusses the rationale behind the Baltic States’ decision to implement the concept of total defence. The next part of the article is devoted to the assumptions of the total defence concept as adopted in various Baltic States. The article then presents the results of a study describing the current level of implementation of assumptions of the total defence concept in individual Baltic States. The final part of the article identifies the challenges of implementing the assumptions of total defence of the Baltic States after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The essence of total defence

A proper understanding of the essence of total defence first requires an understanding of its genesis. Carl von Clausewitz explained that the concept of defence is a way of warding off a blow, while its defining characteristic is to wait for the blow. He also pointed out that the aim of defence is to survive. Clausewitz recognised the potential for civilian involvement in state-led war. He believed that this was a potential that needed to be properly exploited, but the right conditions had to be in place to do so. Some of the important factors include the location where the war is waged and the terrain (Clausewitz, 2006). The rapid and widespread mobilisation of the combat- capable population in the event of an impending war is a key tenet of the total defence concept. The use of the total defence concept in Yugoslavia can serve as a historical example. It has been developed in that country since 1969. However, the ban on surrender became a weak point in the total defence that could lead to the elimination of the civilian population. The concept of total defence that prohibits capitulation, which Yugoslavia adopted in the case of the conflict in the 1990s, contributed to a significant number of casualties (Dulić, Kostić, 2010). From the perspective of the state, rapid and widespread mobilisation is a cost-effective solution because it does not generate the costs of maintaining a regular army. This concept is suitable for small or medium-sized countries with natural conditions that make access to their territory difficult. Total defence is being adopted by states that want to be self-sufficient in terms of defence, but fear a stronger opponent. The most extensive elements of total defence are territorial defence and civil defence. Unlike traditional defence, which is mainly carried out by the armed forces, total defence presupposes the broad involvement of all citizens in different areas of military, civilian, economic, social and psychological life (Marczuk, 2014). The literature lists typical conceptual assumptions that can form the basis of a definition of total defence. These presuppose rapid and universal mobilisation, participation in territorial defence, having civil defence and defence using natural conditions (Zapałowski, 2022).

In addition, total defence is also defined as a concept of military security that implies universal (total) defence by the whole society, organised within the System of Universal Defence (SOP). The change in this paradigm of thinking about military security involves a shift from the existing concept of selective defence of the country, mainly by professional operational troops, to a defence in which the whole society is involved. According to this concept, the main task of the general defence system and of the Territorial Defence Forces (WOT) in particular is to conduct a strategic defence operation and to combat military and non-military threats and crises throughout the country. In contrast, the main task of operational troops is to conduct defensive operations in the most compromised directions, especially when an adversary uses operational formations of conventional troops (Kwaśniak, 2023).

The approach to defence in Latvia is referred to as comprehensive national defence. This means that the aim of Latvia’s comprehensive national defence is to strengthen the country’s deterrence capability, as well as to build resilience to possible armed conflicts and crises. Comprehensive Latvian national defence is understood to mean ensuring security and preparedness in times of crisis in all sectors. In the Latvian defence model, it is important to facilitate effective crisis management at the national level and to prepare Latvian society for the defence of the country. Key elements of Latvia’s comprehensive national defence include support for the work done by the government, energy supply, healthcare, international relations, logistics, economy and infrastructure, internal security, and mental resilience in times of crisis. Comprehensive national defence also involves strengthening ties with the Latvian population, NGOs and public administration, as well as with the business community. This aims to minimise distrust between different groups in society, as well as to reduce people’s distrust of government bodies (Comprehensive National Defence in Latvia, 2019).

Total defence is a concept present in Lithuania’s

defence policy. Characteristic features of the concept include completeness and unconditionality. This means that Lithuania is protected by NATO allied forces as well as national armed forces. In Lithuania’s defence policy, the term ‘total defence’ is understood to mean the mobilisation of all national resources for defence purposes and resistance by the entire Lithuanian people by all means prescribed under the international law. Lithuania’s total defence consists of individual defence, collective defence and NATO membership. According to Lithuania’s defence policy, a threat to the security of an individual ally is a threat to the security of the Alliance. For the total defence of Lithuania, it is important to apply a comprehensive approach to security. Key elements of Lithuania’s national security are the interoperability of military and civilian capabilities and the country’s cooperation with other state institutions (The military strategy of the Republic of Lithuania, 2016).

A comprehensive approach to national defence is one of the most essential elements of Estonian defence policy. Estonia’s comprehensive national defence concept encompasses both military and non-military activities that come from the public and private sectors and civil society. The model of Estonia’s comprehensive national defence concept is to develop military defence and international action. It is also important for military defence to be supported by the civilian sector, to ensure the cohesion of services and psychological defence. Estonia’s national defence concept is based on NATO’s system of individual and collective defence. NATO’s collective defence provides Estonia with reliable deterrence and defence. For the comprehensive defence of Estonia, it is important to strengthen the cohesion of civil society, as security is easier to ensure in a tolerant, caring and participatory society (National Security Concept of Estonia, 2017).

In summary, the understanding of the concept of total defence goes beyond military defence in the Baltic States. However, it is worth noting that, despite the terminological differences, there is a comprehensive dimension to national defence in each of the Baltic States. To defend themselves against potential aggression, the Baltic States rely heavily on the involvement of the private sector, state institutions, social organisations, as well as citizens in defence activities. It is appropriate to highlight the different approaches of the individual countries mentioned above in terms of terminology (Common Defence System – Poland, Comprehensive Defence – Latvia, Estonia and Total Defence – Lithuania).

Rationale for adopting the total defence concept in the Baltic States

Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, growing threats from the Russian Federation have justified the Baltic States undertaking more extensive defence preparations than before. Russia has repeatedly signalled its interest in aggression towards Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. One example of an excuse for this is ‘defending the rights of the Russian minority’. One of Russia’s strategic objectives has become to destroy the security architecture established after the end of the Cold War. To this end, a rapid invasion of the Baltic States and putting NATO on the defensive could be effective (Defence 24, 2019). The key rationale motivating the Baltic States to implement the concept of total defence is their proximity to Russia. Access to the Baltic Sea is strategically important for both NATO and Russia, making these states important elements in the regional balance of power (Parafinowicz, 2017). Organised crime is also a threat from Russia to the Baltic States. An example of this is the activity of the Russian mafia, which, through the corruption of public officials, influences decisions made by legitimate authorities in the Baltic region (INSS, 2020).

The Latvian Concept of State Defence notes the threat posed to Latvia by the rise of military and power politics in international relations as a direct rationale for adopting the concept of comprehensive defence. Authoritarian states disregard generally accepted principles and standards of international law by pursuing aggressive and vague policies while creating cyber, hybrid, conventional and nuclear threats in order to destabilise democratic Western states. For Latvia, one of the increasingly significant challenges to international security consists of the growing ambitions of China, which is using information and communication technologies and cyberattacks among other things in order to strengthen its regional and global influence, seeks to take control of Western technology sectors, industries, critical infrastructure and supply chains (The State Defence Concept, 2023). If Russia’s cooperation with Iran thrives militarily and politically, Russia could become an even greater threat to the Baltic States. This state of affairs confirms the validity of the adoption of the total defence concept by Latvia. The Latvian government also recognises the threat posed by Russia’s desire to divide the world into spheres of influence and expand its territory. Additionally, Russia cultivates propaganda narratives about historic lands (The State Defence Concept, 2023). This stems from the tenets of Russian imperialist ideology, which is based on the principle of ‘where the hat is thrown, there is Russia’. This means that Russia was created as an empire of national ‘peripheries’, and that the metropolis must be territorially united with the colonies. This way of thinking is dangerous not only for the Baltic States, which share borders with Russia, but also for the whole world. Russian imperialism turned all colonised nations into one general mass and imposed its language, religion and culture on them. It did not matter whether they were Slavic Orthodox, Catholics, Protestants, Muslims or even people from the Far East (Ukrainer, 2020). Another threat for Latvia is Russia’s possession of nuclear weapons, which has become a tool of influence and the main guarantee of the regime’s security. In order to influence the decisions of the leaders of NATO member states, Russia often threatens that it may use these weapons. Russia has the world’s largest stockpile of nuclear weapons, estimated at nearly 6,000 warheads (Rzeczpospolita, 2022). Russia’s current nuclear arsenal is significantly smaller than what the Russians had at the time of the USSR. It is currently difficult to estimate the scale on which production of new warheads has developed in Russia (Defence 24, 2022). The complete political dependence of Belarus on Russia has become another threat because of which it was necessary for the Baltic States to adopt the concept of total defence. In order to ensure stability and security, the Russian regime is repressing any opposition. It controls the mass media and restricts freedom of expression. The potential for democratic reform in Russia is low. Russian society is indifferent as to its ability to influence the country’s politics (The State Defence Concept, 2023).

The fundamental rationale for introducing total defence in Lithuania is its key location. Lithuania is one of the Baltic States and a member of NATO, as well as being in proximity to the Isthmus of Suwałki – an area so named by NATO to describe the region of Suwałki, Augustów and Sejny. The area is a key link between the territories of the Baltic States and Poland and other NATO countries, while at the same time it separates the Königsberg Oblast, which belongs to Russia, from Belarus (Parafinowicz, 2017). The Russian military presence in the Königsberg region, including the deployment of Iskander missiles and the activity of the Wagner Group in Belarus, may contribute to an escalated risk of armed incidents in the region (Fedorovich, 2023). Information attacks, such as the dissemination of misleading information to shape public opinion regarding national security and defence, are also a threat to Lithuania. They were intended to generate distrust of the democratic order. The rapid advancement of new technologies has made cyberspace a new area of conflict. The Baltic States have been the targets of a number of cyberattacks attributed to Russian hackers. Attacks on critical infrastructure and government institutions have shown how modern forms of aggression can paralyse a state without conventional armed conflict (Pasławski, 2023). Foreign intelligence activities have become another threat to Lithuania. Their purpose may have been to obtain classified information and to have an adverse effect on the political system, socio- economic life and military capabilities of the state. Threat assessments from the Russian Federation also indicated that Lithuania could be used by terrorists as a transit state. In order to ensure regional security, it is also important to protect energy, transport or cyber infrastructure from potential terrorist attacks and non-military threats, such as climate change, industrial accidents, natural and environmental disasters (The Military Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania, 2012).

Estonia’s implementation of a total defence model was undoubtedly influenced by the cyberattacks Estonia experienced in 2007. Actions related to cyberattacks, such as the riots in Tallinn on 26-28 April 2007, have to be considered an elementary event of this period. The riots were provoked by Russian youths. A pro-Kremlin youth organisation blockaded the Estonian embassy in Moscow. Parallel to the riots, attacks on the Estonian Internet initiated by the Russian organisation ‘Nasi’ started on 27 April. These attacks paralysed online government websites, banks, the media and public schools. The biggest spike in cyberattacks occurred on 9 May 2007 and included the private sector. Large banks and media outlets were forced to suspend their online services (Esti.pl, 2009). Estonia does not rule out a threat such as a direct military attack from Russia, which is why it decided to adopt the concept of total defence. Any action that targets allied solidarity and the integrity of NATO threatens Estonia’s security.

In summary, the Baltic States, as NATO members, had to be prepared for all forms of aggression, including hybrid and conventional actions. They were vulnerable to cyberattacks that could paralyse their countries without the use of Russia’s armed forces. Russian imperialist ideology has also become a motivating factor for the Baltic States to implement the concept of total defence. In this context, the impact of global threats on the regional situation of these countries has also become relevant. Russia’s possession of nuclear weapons and growing authoritarianism, for example in neighbouring Belarus, have also given rise to the concept of total defence in the Baltic States. Corruption was another reason for adopting total defence. It was Russia’s tool used to exert political and economic pressure in the Baltic region.

Assumptions of the total defence concept in indi- vidual Baltic States

The lack of trust in the Russian Federation’s peaceful intentions towards individual Baltic States contributed to their accession to NATO in 2004. In retrospect, the accession of these countries to the Alliance was a good decision from the perspective of national security. This was confirmed by Russia’s subsequent actions, which included the invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014. These events may have indicated that Russia may still have been tempted to initiate an armed conflict with one of the Baltic States. As a result of the expansive actions of the Russian Federation, the individual Baltic States have begun to implement, to the best of their ability, the concept of total defence in terms of national security. This section of the article presents the topic of total defence in the individual Baltic States focusing on the assumptions that were in place prior to the full- scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Latvia’s approach to total (comprehensive) defence before 2022 focused on two basic assumptions: the resilience of society in peacetime and the defence of the country in wartime. In times of crisis and war, one of the tasks of comprehensive defence was to organise armed resistance the activities of which would support the Latvian National Armed Forces and allied forces, for example, through the exchange of information, the organisation of supplies, as well as through the organisation of resistance and the implementation of passive resistance such as civil disobedience. Another key task for the implementation of total defence in times of crisis and war was to preserve the continuity of state power, maintain the capacity of society and the economy to provide critical services, including the timely generation and storage of critical resources, services and raw material reserves, such as electricity, communications, financial services, food and critical infrastructure (National Defence Concept, 2020).

The 2020 strategy pointed out that the cooperation of the Latvian National Armed Forces with civilian structures plays an important role in the defence of the state. It aims to include specific institutions such as National Border Guard, Security Administration of the Bank of Latvia and Civil Aviation Agency in the planning of activities and exercises carried out by the National Armed Forces of Latvia. Ensuring that civilian and military communications are secure and resilient against attempted disruption is also important. Cooperation and an efficient exchange of information between all institutions have also become important. An example of such cooperation was to be the strengthening of the effectiveness of military medicine through cooperation with Latvian universities and the health sector in the development of crisis training and response plans (National Defence Concept, 2020). An equally important and often mentioned issue in favour of comprehensive defence was the improvement and regular testing during exercises of the Civil Defence Operational Management Centre’s ability to cooperate with the Latvian National Armed Forces, state institutions, municipal civil defence commissions, as well as with businesses (Ministry of Defence, 2020).

Latvia’s comprehensive national defence was also intended to popularise a culture of preparedness so that citizens would be prepared for the worst scenarios possible. The focus in this area is therefore on strengthening the National Guard and the Young Guard through youth and public education. Issues related to the strengthening of national cyber-security and national cyber-defence capabilities have not been overlooked either (National Armed Forces, 2018).

In the case of Lithuania, total defence assumptions focused more on the military than the civilian sphere before 2022. The most significant challenges in building Lithuania’s national defence capabilities were based on three pillars. The first pillar was to build and develop national military capabilities by increasing funding for the Lithuanian Armed Forces. Military capacity was to be increased through an increase in the number of soldiers, those with military training, and compulsory initial military service personnel, who would have the capacity to transition to universal conscription (National Security Strategy, 2021). The second pillar focuses on ensuring collective security by developing and strengthening NATO’s collective defence dimension. Readiness to fulfil all North Atlantic Treaty obligations, and in particular the provisions of Article 5, has also become important (Military Research and Analysis Team, 2018). The third pillar focused on ensuring the readiness of state and local government institutions and citizens to support the implementation of defence tasks. The implementation of these tasks was to consist mainly of the development of plans for national defence and the state mobilisation system, as well as the organisation of unarmed national defence and peaceful civil resistance.

Lithuania’s defence capability assumptions were also to be based on the provision of a sufficient strategic reserve and the necessary production capacity. It has also become important to improve the integration of the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union into the national security and defence system and to promote civic and patriotic education. The support for NGOs promoting citizenship and patriotism by teaching the basics of defence at all levels of education was supposed to be an additional asset in creating defence preparedness. Developing dialogue between the public, private and non-governmental sectors regarding security and national defence has also become significant (National Security Strategy, 2021).

Estonia’s total defence is based on NATO’s collective defence among other things. However, it is worth noting that it also includes paramilitary operations such as guerrilla activities and resistance movements. The main priorities for the development of the Defence Forces, included in Estonia’s National Security Concept of 2011, included strengthening early warning and command and control capabilities. There has also been a focus on developing an effective preparedness and mobilisation system, on training and creating reserve units. The need was noted to improve the effectiveness of operations undertaken from the Estonian territory against any adversary and to participate in international operations. Attention was also given to ensuring host nation’s support for allied forces, as well as to sustainable development of human resources, supplies and logistics (National Defence Strategy Estonia, 2011).

It is noteworthy that due to numerous hacking attacks from the Russian Federation, the Estonian authorities have started to consistently improve its cybersecurity, which has become one of the main priorities to be implemented for the security of the state (Polish Institute of International Affairs, 2018).

Supporting the civilian sector for the purpose of military defence was supposed to involve the preparation and the efficient execution out the mobilisation of the Defence Forces, as well as an improved readiness of the Defence Forces through inter-agency cooperation and the Ministry of Defence. The Defence Resources Agencywasto play an important role in this regard by keeping records of those fit for service in the Defence Forces and being responsible for the operation of the relevant registers (National Defence Strategy Estonia, 2021). It is noteworthy that Estonia has been and still is particularly vulnerable to disinformation campaigns conducted by the Russian Federation, which is why Estonia’s approach to total defence included psychological defence in the development of which the public was to be involved (Kamiński, 2020). Estonian psychological defence involves the cultivation of its society’s shared values, identity and livelihood security in order to foster self-confidence and to shape the will of the nation to defend the country (Szymański, 2020).

The main focus of Estonia’s international efforts was on involving NATO and the internal security institutions of EU member states in exercises organised in Estonia and increasing their frequency. An important role in this regard was to be played by the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences as a reserve unit with responsibilities in the direct provision of internal security (National Defence Strategy Estonia, 2021). In the event of a potential military attack on Estonia though, it was crucial to ensure the sustainability and continuation of the key services, which were expected to operate according to the same principles and within the same organisational framework as they would under peacetime conditions (Szymański, 2020). Therefore, National Defence Planning based on operational and emergency plans (National Defence Strategy Estonia, 2021) had an important role to play in this regard.

In conclusion, it is worth noting that, despite the

pursuit of common goals in ensuring national and regional security, the approach and assumptions regarding the creation of total defence differed somewhat between the Baltic States. Estonia and Latvia were more focused on getting other services, civilians, as well as governmental and non- governmental organisations more involved in total defence than Lithuania, which concentrated its efforts more towards modernising the army. Estonia has embarked on a broader drive to improve its cybersecurity compared to the other Baltic States. This was in response to numerous cyber incidents initiated by Russian service hackers, among others. It should be emphasised that planning alone and the creation of various types of strategies and concepts are insufficient in order to ensure the effective defence of a country. An important measure that would have the effect of improving the security of the Baltic States is the streamlined and thoughtful implementation of these plans and assumptions.

Current level of implementation of the total de- fence concept in the individual Baltic States

The current levels of implementation of the total defence concept vary for the individual Baltic States. This state of affairs may be due to the fact that each of the Baltic States perceives and interprets certain threats in its own individual way. Rapidly occurring events in the region and the world contribute to changing priorities and the implementation of assumptions contained in specific defence strategies. These events include Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the migration crisis caused by the actions of Russian and Belarusian services.

For Latvia, one of the important steps to attain the objectives of the total defence concept has been to take advantage of the capabilities of the National Guard (Latvian: Zemessardze). It is the largest and, in territorial terms, the most numerous structure of the Latvian National Armed Forces, which gave its citizens the opportunity to serve their homeland voluntarily (Likumi, 2016). Public sentiment indicated that the younger generation that would be affected by conscription was favourably disposed towards the coming changes. An increased interest in serving in the National Guard has been an indication of positive public perception. Approximately 1,800 people enrolled in the Latvian National Guard in 2022. In the following months, the number of volunteers was lower by around 200 to 500 people, but still remained higher than in the previous year. In 2022, the Latvian Ministry of Defence assumed that the size of the armed forces in case of war would reach around 50,000 soldiers in the next five years. This would more than double the size of the army from the 2022 figure of 6,700 soldiers on active duty, 9,500 soldiers in the National Guard and 3,000 reservists (OSW, 2022). In order to enlarge the Latvian army, the Parliament in Riga decided to create the State Defence Service in 2023 (Latvian: Valsts aizsardzības dienests, VAD). The authorities in Riga have thus reinstated compulsory military service, previously abolished in 2007. The reinstatement of compulsory military service was intended to prepare Latvian society for any crisis (TVN 24 BiS, 2023). On the issue of total defence, Latvia places considerable emphasis on defence education for young people. The aim of the Young Guard (Latvian: Jaunsardze) has instead become to involve 10 per cent of schoolchildren by 2024, and 6 per cent of young adults aged 20 to 21, i.e. approximately 9,500 young people, by 2018 (Likumi, 2016). The Young Guard movement has become the largest children and youth movement in Latvia. It aims to educate young people in patriotism, civic awareness, bravery and physical fitness, camaraderie and national defence. More than 8,500 young people belonged to the Young Guard in 2023 (Zemgales Zinas, 2023). Educating children and young people about the basics of statehood and imparting defence skills were reflected in the implementation of the pilot project entitled National Defence Lesson. Strategic level exercises of the Council of Ministers ‘Kristaps’ and exercises of the municipal civil defence commissions ‘Pilskalns’ organised by the National Armed Forces of Latvia have also been set up in order to effectively implement Latvia’s defence system. In order to promote supporting the public with reliable industry media, an information portal “https://www.sargs.lv/” dedicated to defence and security topics has been created. To promote society’s resilience to crises, the Latvian Ministry of Defence has also prepared information material in text and video form on how to deal with emergencies, so that every citizen can take care of themselves and their family during the first 72 hours of a crisis or war (Ministry of Defence, 2023).

Among other things, Lithuania has engaged in the development of international cooperation in order to fulfil its total defence tasks. Overall, it can be said that the NATO summit held in Vilnius in the summer was a success for Lithuania. For example, regional defence plans were approved. The importance of bringing the democracies of Asia and Europe closer together was noted, as was the relevance of the links between the security situations in both regions (ICDS, 2023). Despite Russia’s full-scale invasion in Ukraine, Lithuania has been tardy in implementing its promised population-wide defence plans. The Lithuanian Parliament adopted a resolution approving the Civil Resistance Strategy in 2022, but there is still no plan for its implementation. According to Lithuanian Deputy Defence Minister Žilvins Tomkus, the slow development of the plan was not only attributable to the Ministry of Defence. He noted that other state institutions were also expected to contribute to preparing citizens for civil resistance. In addition, Tomkus pointed out that the main focus was on professional soldiers and conscripts, i.e. those obliged to defend the country. In turn, Lithuanian Defence Minister Arvydas Anušauskas stressed the important role of the Riflemen’s Association in providing civil defence courses; however, according to the organisation’s commander, homeland defence is everyone’s business and not just that of the Riflemen’s Association (LRT, 2023).

Military defence of the state, the objectives of the Estonian Defence Forces and the Estonian Defence League were the main focus of the first strategic defence planning documents of the Republic of Estonia. It is worth noting that, following integration into NATO and the European Union, it was significantly expanded to include non-military defence elements. For example, Estonia’s National Security Concept of 2017 was developed to include the area of social cohesion and psychological defence of society (Kamiński, 2020). In addition, Estonia conducts non-military defence operations to prepare the public for defence. Many paramilitary organisations operating in Estonia help prepare the public for defence, for example, by providing patriotic and civic education (Staśkiewicz, 2021). The Estonian Defence League plays a significant role for Estonia’s total defence. This non-political, paramilitary organisation has been integrated into the country’s security system. The Estonian Defence League is part of the Estonian armed forces under the Estonian Defence League Act. The Estonian Defence League’s tasks include improving the security of Estonians and organising training to improve defence skills. Promoting patriotism and sport is also part of the Estonian Defence League’s remit (Defence Union Act, 2013). The current concept of Estonian total defence comprises six pillars: military defence, civil support, international action, internal security, continuity of state and society, and strategic communication. This means that the effectiveness of national protection is determined by military and non-military capabilities. In order to effectively implement the assumptions of total defence, Estonia adopted an updated version of the National Security Concept among other things. The document responded to the security developments related to the Russian-Ukrainian war. In this respect, the most significant plans are related to an increase in defence spending in the next few years to the minimum of 3% of GDP, as well as funding for non-military civil protection activities. In general, it can be said that Estonia’s efforts to fulfil the tasks posed by total state defence are mainly based on increased defence spending, educating the public and strengthening their will to defend themselves, cooperating with allies, e.g. within NATO, consolidating the country’s international position, including through involvement in helping Ukraine (Institute of Central Europe 2023). It should be emphasised that despite the fact that the States spend more than 3% of GDP on defence, these funds are relatively small in relation to their needs, as the GDP of these small countries is relatively small (Lithuania is ranked 68, Estonia 79 and Latvia 87 in terms of defence spending out of 145 countries ranked in the Global Fire Power 2024 ranking in the category: defence finances). Given the scarcity of funds, these countries have to be very careful in prioritising the allocation of money for individual defence tasks especially in terms of Host Nation Support (under NATO Article 3).

To sum it up, the current degree of implementation of the total defence concept in the Baltic States varies. All Baltic States are aware of the threat from Russia. Together, they recognise the need to increase the size of their armies and to modernise the military. However, many assumptions of total defence remain, which are being implemented in different areas of these states’ operations and with varying degrees of commitment. For example, when it comes to total defence, Latvia places a significant emphasis on education, while Lithuania focuses on the development of international cooperation. It is worth noting that despite Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Lithuania has been tardy in implementing its promised all-encompassing defence plans. In the case of Estonia, the effectiveness of the country’s total defence concept is currently determined by a comprehensive approach involving the development of military and non-military capabilities. Specific measures have been taken in the Baltic States to reduce the potential negative security impact associated with Russian minorities.

A separate thread that needs to be presented is the fact that, due to the existence of a large Russian- speaking minority groups in Latvia and Estonia (these minority groups account for 32% and 25% of citizens respectively), (Zasadni, 2022) a number of measures have been taken to reduce the alienation of minorities from their countries of residence. In this respect, a very important fact is that radio and television broadcasting in Russian was intensified in Estonia and Latvia after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 in order to better reach Russian-speaking residents, so that they did not have to rely exclusively on Russian portals or news programmes. In Daugavpils, Latvia, where the majority of the population speaks Russian, steps have been taken to better integrate these communities with the rest of the country, including through bilingual education and cultural programmes. In response to rising tensions in Lithuania, the authorities have taken steps to improve integration and prevent the isolation of the Russian minority, promoting intercultural dialogue and mutual understanding. Also in Estonia, a decision made in response to potential security threats was to expand media offerings in minority languages, including Russian, in order to provide more balanced access to information (Institute of Central Europe 2022).

Challenges for the total defence of the Baltic States after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022

Following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2022, new challenges have arisen for the Baltic States. These included increased defence spending and the need to ensure energy security. The implementation of effective measures to help combat the instrumentalisation of migration, which is one element of hybrid warfare, has also become a new challenge. Due to an increased number of cyberattacks from Russia, the measures used to combat cyber threats also had to be modernised. Improving and increasing the size of the army and the need to strengthen the cohesion of society also proved to be significant elements to be implemented within the total defence concept. The need for the Baltic States to support Ukraine and its integrity is also worth noting. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2022 was a critical turning point in the Baltic Sea region. The Baltic States faced the challenge to significantly increase defence spending in the face of growing threats. Defence spending is set to increase in Lithuania to 2.7 per cent of GDP, Latvia to 2.4 per cent of GDP and Estonia to 3.2 per cent of GDP in 2024. The development of the

Baltic States’ defence involved a significant increase in defence spending. The Baltic States allocate funds for defence improvements from their own budgets, and are also supported by members of the Alliance.

Rising electricity prices and the low filling of the natural gas storage facility in Inčukalns, Latvia, became another challenge for the Baltic States after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2022. The key challenge in this situation has become to improve energy security through infrastructure development and the completion of the GIPL pipeline and the modernisation of the Mažeikiai refinery. The Klaipeda regasification terminal is an important tool for diversification of natural gas supply sources and directions in the Baltic States. The Klaipeda LNG terminal and the GIPL pipeline could also play a significant role in Ukraine’s energy security. Russia’s strategy to destabilise the natural gas market through the certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline has adversely affected the energy situation of the Baltic States. High natural gas prices on the exchanges have also caused electricity and heat prices to rise (Institute of Central Europe, 2022). It is important for total defence that the Baltic States focus on improving energy security and synchronising with the European grid. It is essential that these countries become independent of Russia in this respect (Institute of Central Europe, 2023).

The instrumentalisation of migration consisted of deliberately creating a migration crisis at the external borders of the European Union. Belarus has become responsible for the sponsored smuggling of migrants into the European Union. The Belarusian regime has been active in attracting migrants from Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan and other countries. Migrants were encouraged and even forced to cross the borders of the European Union. The pressure was exerted on Poland, Lithuania and Latvia in particular. Such behaviour was an example of a hybrid threat, destabilising society and the institutions of the European Union. It also endangered the lives of many desperate people and forced them into undignified conditions (Hołdyńska, 2023). The instrumentalisation of migration for political purposes was a worrying phenomenon initiated in 2021 at the external borders of the European Union and continued to be practised after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2022. The instrumentalisation of migration became both a surprise and a challenge to the Baltic States, as state border protection services, hospitals, state administration and NGOs, among others, were involved in combating it. The comprehensive approach to defence implied by the concept of total defence is crucial in combating hybrid threats, as these involve more than just conventional armed attacks.

A report in the February 2023 Thales Cyber Threat Intelligence Report reveals that the third quarter of 2022 has become a turning point. Cyber warfare focused on Ukrainian and Russian territories has developed to the level of a high-intensity hybrid conflict. Attacks were launched against the Baltic States, among others. These attacks mainly targeted key sectors such as energy, banking, aviation, health infrastructure or public institutions. At the very beginning of the conflict in Ukraine, cyberattacks mainly targeted that country, but subsequent months saw a sharp increase in incidents across the European Union. The Baltic States have become a particularly important target for wartime hacktivists. By the end of 2022, some 157 cyberattacks were reported on their territories. In response to aggression, the Baltic States attacked in cyberspace took steps to ensure improved cybersecurity (Thales, 2023). Growing awareness and response to cyber threats are a key part of the challenges of the Baltic States’ defence strategy (Stop Fake PL, 2023).

The Baltic States fear that they could become the next target after Russia’s attack on Ukraine, so they are preparing for battle. Among other things, they focus on increasing the presence of troops that could serve as the first line of defence in the event of a Russian onslaught. According to a NATO report of June 2022, each Baltic state had a multinational combat group of between 1,400 and 1,900 soldiers. These units had tanks, armoured fighting vehicles and heavy artillery at their disposal. At last year’s summit in Madrid, NATO members agreed to allocate more troops to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Brigade-sized units of up to 5,000 soldiers were deployed to protect each of these countries. The Baltic States will also need an adequate supply of ammunition and weapons to protect themselves from tanks and armoured personnel carriers, as well as weapon systems such as the US FGM-148 Javelin or FIM-92 Stinger. As the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for European and NATO Policy Jim Townsend announced, the Baltic States’ defence strategy should essentially be to turn these countries into ‘porcupines’. The aim is to ‘increase the pain’ that could be inflicted on Moscow if it tried to attack. Improving and increasing the size of the armies in the Baltic States has become another key challenge for the total defence of these states after 2022 (Business Insider, 2023).

Strengthening the cohesion of society is a significant element of total defence. In order to survive a crisis related to military aggression or natural disaster, it is important that society is able to provide support to the fighting armed forces. Until now, main elements seen as a guarantee of security included joining NATO or implementing technical modernisations. It is worth noting that countries were less focused on the implementation of non-military state structures for times of crisis (Defence 24, 2020). Following the outbreak of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the challenge for the societies of the Baltic States may have been to get prepared to defend the state. While the willingness of the population to resist the aggressor in the face of war increased among Lithuanians and Estonians, the willingness of Latvian citizens to defend the state in a threatening situation was much lower. Of all the nations in the Baltic States, the Estonians expressed the greatest readiness to defend themselves. Approximately 81% of Estonians would carry out armed resistance in the event of an attack. In turn, 53% of residents would be ready for armed combat in the event of aggression against Lithuania. A different trend is observed in Latvia. In 2020, around 31% of the population were ready to defend the country militarily. In 2022, the rate was 13% lower (Institute of Central Europe, 2023). On the basis of the above data, it can be concluded that the willingness of the public in the Baltic States to defend their countries is not entirely consistent. It is important that the citizens of each of these countries are involved at a similarly high level in the defence of their country in the event of aggression. This could significantly increase their chances of defending themselves more effectively.

After Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2022, the challenge for the Baltic States became to actively support Ukraine with military equipment despite their much smaller financial capacity relative to other NATO countries. The Baltic States, by their own admission, provide significant support to Ukraine. It includes, for example, Mi-8/17 multipurpose helicopters or towed artillery such as the D-30 and FH70. The Baltic States’ modernisation processes and the purchase of new equipment allow them to hand over Mi-8/17 helicopters. In addition, Estonia is acquiring modern K9A1 self-propelled howitzers, the number of which was recently increased to 42. This allows the transfer to Ukraine of further towed trailing systems like the D-30 cal. 122 mm or the better FH70 cal. 155 mm. Lithuania also transferred dozens of Bofors L70 anti- aircraft guns with ammunition and Mi-8 multipurpose helicopters in a new package of military aid to Ukraine. The value of this package is approximately €125 million. Latvia has decided to support Ukraine with the transfer of 2 Mi-17 multipurpose helicopters, 10 FIM-92 Stinger shoulder-fired very short-range anti- aircraft missile launchers (MANPADS), 10 machine guns and an unspecified number of UAVs (Defence 24, 2023). The Baltic States are trying with all their might to support Ukraine despite their limited capacity in relation to other, richer NATO countries. They see the need to take such action because they are aware that if Ukraine succumbs to the Russian onslaught, they could become the aggressor’s next target.

In conclusion, after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2022, many new challenges have arisen for the Baltic States. In order to improve border security, energy security, cybersecurity, and internal and national security, these countries have had to effectively counter threats in the short term. Russia’s aggressive policy makes it a legitimate course of action in this situation for the Baltic States to increase defence spending and improve their armed forces. In order to deal effectively with the new challenges facing the Baltic States after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2022, a comprehensive total defence approach may be crucial. This state of affairs should encourage the Baltic States to continue to develop further their efforts to implement elements of this concept.

Summary

A comprehensive system such as total defence covers not only the involvement of the armed forces but also the actions of society and various state institutions. The common rationale behind the Baltic States’ decision to adopt the concept of total defence was the threat from Russia. The Baltic States were exposed to hybrid and conventional operations by Russia. The strategic location of the Baltic States and sharing a common border with Russia is a threat in itself. The Baltic States are also vulnerable to cyberattacks and foreign intelligence activities. Russia’s rebuilding of spheres of influence is also worrying. For the Baltic States, the common premise of the total defence concept was the pursuit of national and regional security. However, despite the pursuit of common goals, the approach regarding the creation of total defence differed across the individual Baltic States. Lithuania’s total defence concept was geared more towards the modernisation of the army, while Latvia and Estonia were geared towards engaging civilians, other services, as well as governmental and non-governmental organisations in total defence. Estonia has pursued cybersecurity to a greater extent compared to other countries. In order to implement the concept of total defence, the Baltic States have focused on engaging the armed forces, the public and state institutions in defence. Estonia was most successful in applying a comprehensive approach to defence, as it sought to implement all the tenets of the total defence concept simultaneously. After Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2022, the Baltic States faced new challenges in implementing the concept of total defence. These consisted of an increased defence spending and the need to ensure energy security. Due to the migration crisis on the border with Belarus, the Baltic States have also had to focus on improving border security. The higher number of cyberattacks in 2022 has prompted the Baltic States to modernise their methods of fighting cyber threats. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has prompted the Baltic States to increase the size of their armed forces and to modernise. The countries also focused on strengthening the cohesion of society and bringing support to Ukraine and its integrity. Three main conclusions can be detailed to sum it up. Firstly, in terms of adapting the concept of total defence to local needs, the Baltic States have applied the concept of total defence in response to Russian threats, but each has adapted it to their unique circumstances. The second conclusion focuses around responding to growing threats and enhancing security: in response to the Russian aggression against Ukraine and related challenges such as the migration crisis and cyberattacks, the Baltic States intensified various defence activities and thirdly, the effectiveness of comprehensive defence and regional solidarity in which Estonia was particularly effective in implementing all aspects of the total defence concept. All three Baltic States focused on strengthening societal cohesion and on support for Ukraine, emphasising the value and the innovativeness of the total defence approach for national and regional security. Evidently, they are not confining themselves to merely sustaining existing operations, but rather are constantly developing their total defence.